Abstract-We consider a network of Internet of Things devices transmitting to an IoT Gateway (IoT-GW). Such communications can potentially be overheard by one or multiple eavesdroppers. Our goal is to design an artificial noise (AN)-aided transmit strategy in order to enhance security against eavesdropping. We propose a communication design where the potential eavesdroppers are deactivated by means of jamming operations performed by 1) an In-Band Full Duplex (IBFD) IoT-GW and/or by 2) cooperative helpers featuring multiple antennas. We show that the solution where only the IBFD IoT-GW generates AN is feasible for small IoT networks and when a neutralization zone around each IoT-device is assumed. In the case with helpers instead, we show that the Average number of Secure Connections (ASC) increases at least exponentially with the density of the helpers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is regarded as the next big revolution in digital communications. Billions of old and new physical objects (aka Things) -embedded with sensors, controllers and actuators -will soon become IoT-augmented, i.e., will be enabled to sense, process and transmit data; with a tremendous impact on industrial processes, business services and people's everyday life. In this new context, wireless communications are the key to provide connectivity to the Things; the latter are by definition extremely limited in terms of battery/processing power and architecture, so that the unique opportunities linked to IoT come along with unique challenges.
In this paper, we address the problem of protecting IoT uplink data, consisting of users' private information, from eavesdropping. Motivated by the fact that using traditional cryptographic tools is not practical nor realistic with IoT networks (seen the extremely limited amount of resources available at the IoT-devices and IoT-gateways IoT-GW) we propose the use of Physical (PHY) layer security achieved by smart jamming operations. We assume in one instance that the position of the eavesdropper(s) is unknown. In another instance, we assume that the position of eavesdropper within a certain discovery region around each IoT-device can be figured out. Either way, secrecy across the whole IoT network is ensured by leveraging In-Band Full-Duplex (IBFD) technology and/or cooperative jamming, and will present a first methodic study which points out the practicability of the presented solutions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study bridging the gap between information-theoretical tools and practical IoT applications.
PHY layer security is an information-theoretic approach that allows to achieve secrecy by using channel codes and signal processing techniques. The seminal work of Wyner [1] dated 1975 introduced the degraded wiretap channel and the fundamental notion of secrecy capacity. Three years later, Wyner's secrecy capacity formulation was generalized to nondegraded broadcast channels with confidential information [2] and Gaussian wiretap channels [3] ; and more recently to multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels [4] . In the meantime, the literature on secrecy capacity has been growing: Many papers can be found on the secrecy rate maximization problem with one or more eavesdroppers (see [5] , [6] and references therein) and with different assumptions on transmitter/receiver/eavesdropper antenna configurations and channel state information (CSI).
A few works focus on the case where there is no Eve's CSI (i.e., the position of the eavesdropper is unknown): In [7] the authors presented scaling results on the per-node secure throughput in a network of transmitter-receiver pairs. In [8] a stochastic cooperative jamming strategy to thwart the eavesdropper(s) anywhere in the network was proposed. Compared to this strategy, the cooperative scheme we propose in this paper does not cause data rate degradation to the legacy IoT users and does not require protocol modifications. In [9] the authors proposed a secure transmission design between a secondary transmitter-receiver pair in the presence of randomly distributed eavesdroppers under an interference constraint set by the primary user. In [10] the authors presented a scheme for compensating non-altruistic secondary users (SUs) for providing jamming service by providing variable spectrum resources. This can be used in conjunction with stochastic protocols to optimize CR performance [11] , [12] .
As for IBFD technology, this was firstly thought as a way to enhance spectrum efficiency [13] . It was then proposed as a way to provide PHY layer secrecy by letting legacy nodes receive and at the same time transmit AN (see, e.g., [14] and references therein). However, the biggest practical impediments to IBFD operation is the presence of selfinterference, i.e., the interference caused by an IBFD nodes own transmissions to its desired receptions [15] . Differently to this literature, in this paper we take the self-interference cancellation constraint into account and provide results accordingly.
With this paper, our contribution is three-fold:
‚ We consider a generic IoT network and formulate the problem of guaranteeing security against eavesdropping by taking into account the self-interference cancellation constraint (Section II). ‚ We provide simple design rules for enhancing confidentiality across the IoT network, regardless of Eve's position, in the cases where: -the AN is broadcast by the IoT-GW only and no assumption is made wrt nodes spatial distribution (Section III). -the AN is broadcast by the IoT-GW and/or by a set of cooperative jammers featuring multiple antennas and nodes are assumed to be distributed according to a Poisson Point Process (Section IV).
‚ We analyze the effectiveness of our solutions by simulation with real NB-IoT settings (Section V).
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Network Model
Let Bpx, ρq be a disk centered at node position x with radius ρ. We define our network over a disk Bp0, Rq, where 0 is the origin and corresponds to the location of the IoT-GW. Let X " t1, .., x, ..#X u and X " tx i u iPX Ă Bp0, Rq denote the set of IoT devices and of their locations respectively. Similarly, let E " t1, .., e, ..#Eu and E " tx e u be the set of eavesdroppers and of their locations; and let K and K " tx k u kPK denote the set of helpers and of their locations. The IoT devices transmit data to the IoT-GW which for convenience will be referred to as device 0 located at x 0 . The IoT-GW features IBFD technology and is therefore able to receive and transmit on the same frequency band for security purposes. All operations occur on the same frequency band B 1 centered at f 1 and characterized by background noise power N 1 " N 0 B 1 . The resulting network is sketched in Fig. 1 . Similarly to [8] , [7] , only path loss is assumed for static wireless channels. The IoT-GW self-interference cancellation gain and the Euclidean distance between two nodes x and y are denoted by h 0 and d xy respectively. The channel gain g xy is assumed to be equal to g min ą 0 for the co-located case d xy " 0, otherwise strictly decreasing on the distance d xy and not dependent on the considered nodes. All nodes are assumed to be static, and the eavesdroppers are passively operating independently of each other. That is, there exists no collusion among eavesdroppers. All IoT devices transmit with the same power P and all the helpers transmit with the same power Q. The IoT-GW AN transmit power is denoted by P 0 .
B. Secure Communications
In order for the data transmission from an IoT device i to be securely received at a destination node j in the presence of an eavesdropper e, the secrecy capacity (i.e., the maximum transmission rate at which the eavesdropper is unable to decode any information) should be strictly positive. By using Shannon's formula for channel capacity, we can determine the secrecy capacity C ij (in bits/s/Hz) of the communication between i and j at each separate transmission as in [8] :
That is, i and j can achieve secure communication if i transmits at a secrecy rate less than C ij . Let us now define γ 0 and γ E as the minimum SINR regime at which the IoT-GW and the eavesdroppers can decode packets. That means, the data transmission from an IoT device i can be correctly received by the IoT-GW and by an eavesdropper e only if SIN R i0 ě γ 0 and SIN R ie ě γ E respectively. Hence, for γ E ă γ 0 , we can define a secure connection similarly to [8] :
Definition 1 (Secure Connection). A connection from x i to x 0 is secure if and only if
where γ E ă γ 0 , γ E can be arbitrarily small and where
In our model, the security conditions (2) are met thanks to jamming operations which generate neutralization zones.
Definition 2 (Neutralization zone).
A neutralization zone is a 2-dimensional region across which it is not possible for the eavesdroppers to wiretap the transmissions performed by any IoT device of the network.
We model the neutralization zones by disks Bpx, ρq, x Ă Bp0, 2Rq, ρ ą 0. The jamming operation are performed by the IBFD IoT-GWs emitting artificial noise (AN) with power P 0 and/or a set of cooperative helpers. The IBFD IoT-GW is then able to partially cancel the related self-interference from its in-band receive antenna. We say partially because self-interference cancellation is a complex operation and so far it has only been proven the possibility to cancel up to 110dB [15] .
C. Problem Statement
We aim at finding feasible parameter configurations so as to guarantee secure connections to the IoT devices. We study two cases:
1) The statistical distributions of IoT devices and eavesdroppers are unknown (there are no helpers). In this case, we aim to find what is the minimum transmit power to be allocated to the IoT-GW for the AN, and what is the minimum performance in terms of self-interference cancellation if the IoT-GW wants to guarantee secure connections to all IoT devices in the network. 2) IoT devices, eavesdroppers and helpers are distributed according to an independent Poisson Point Process with given intensities. In this case, we aim to obtain the average number of secure connections that can be guaranteed across the IoT network.
III. JAMMING FROM THE IOT-GW ONLY Let us firstly focus on the case where there are no cooperative jamming nodes and the eavesdroppers are spread across the IoT-network. This is equivalent to setting Q " 0 in (4) . In this scenario we define a worst case connection as follows:
Definition 3 (Worst case connection). The worst case connection is the one occurring from the farthest IoT-device (from the IoT-GW) when an eavesdropper e˚is co-located with it.
Since all IoT nodes transmit with the same power P , and the channel gains are strictly decreasing in the Euclidean distance, the following proposition is straightforward. Proposition 1. An IoT network is fully secure (i.e., the connections from all IoT devices are secure) if the worst case connection is secure.
Since the positions of IoT devices and eavesdroppers are unknown, the IoT-GW can guarantee secure connections to all of its associated IoT-devices by generating a neutralization zone covering the whole IoT network. Theorem 1. Assume g xy " f pd xy q is a monotone function (strictly decreasing in Euclidean distance d xy and not dependent on the position of x and y). Further, assume i˚is the farthest IoT-device from the IoT-GW and e˚is its co-located eavesdropper. Then:
1) The IoT-GW can guarantee secure connections to all its associated IoT-devices if
2) When such condition holds, there exists a minimum feasible AN power allocation P 0 for which all IoT device connections are secure:
where is the smallest power increasing step.
Proof. See Appendix.
However, as shown in the numerical section (Section V), the above solution comes at the cost of extremely high IoT-GW AN transmit power. This reduces drastically the business potential of the proposed technique (for instance, it would be unrealistic to install such power-hungry IoT-GW at the users' premises) and motivates us to seek other ways to improve the IoT network secrecy capacity while reducing the IoT-GW power consumption. Thus, we now study the cases with protected surroundings and with helpers.
A. Protected Surroundings
In some scenarios, each legitimate IoT-node may be able to physically inspect its surroundings and deactivate the eavesdroppers falling inside some neutralization region. With each node, we associate a neutralization zone inside which all eavesdroppers have been deactivated. This can be the case for indoor IoT nodes (e.g., within the smart home walls).
For finite neutralization zones and by assuming a larger eavesdroppers network, we need to define a worst connection with neutralization zones:
Definition 4 (Worst case connection with neutralization zones). In the presence of finite neutralization zones around each IoT-device the worst case connection occurs when an eavesdropper e˚is located just outside the neutralization region, on the farthest point from the IoT-GW. 
y). Let i˚be the farthest IoT-device from the IoT-GW and e˚be the eavesdropper located on the farthest point from the IoT-GW which is just outside the neutralization zone. Then, 1) the IoT-GW can guarantee secure connections to all its associated IoT-devices if
We will show in the simulation section how even a neutralization zone of limited size allows to greatly reduce the IoT-GW power consumption.
IV. COOPERATIVE APPROACHES
A simple and yet powerful strategy for lowering the IoT-GW transmit power while guaranteed a certain degree of secrecy is cooperative jamming [16] . In cooperative jamming, the IoT-GW artificial noise is complemented by the jamming signal(s) emitted by a set of friendly jammers or helpers. In the following subsections, we assume that nodes in E , K and X are distributed according to an independent Poisson Point Process (PPP) [17] with intensities λ E , λ K and λ X respectively across a disk of radius R centered at the IoT-GW. We then propose two cooperative jamming strategies and provide a systematic study of their performance.
A. Based on the location of eavesdroppers
In this section we consider a cooperative model where the IoT network is populated by helpers which are able to neutralize potential eavesdroppers located in their close proximity. The resulting IoT network is sketched in Fig. 2 , where the white areas are the neutralization zones generated by the helpers. Note that the considered model with neutralization zones is general enough to include different sorts of physical realizations. For example, the helpers can be radio transceivers able to sense even passive eavesdroppers from their leaked local oscillator power as described in [18] then, using directional antennas they can send a jamming signal towards these eavesdroppers. Using the same model, the neutralization regions can be viewed as trusted areas where no eavesdropper can be found, for example this could be locations where physical security measures dissuade the eavesdroppers.
In the following, we will rate the level of confidentiality of an IoT network by its Average number of Secure Connections (ASC) to the IoT-GW. However, due to the fact that a practical IoT network is envisioned to comprise thousands of IoT devices, running a Monte Carlo simulation to obtain the ASC can be very daunting and could take days. Therefore, we aim to obtain a closed-form expression of the ASC lower bound as this can indeed provide a powerful tool to analyze IoT networks within shorter terms and limited resources.
Let us recall that helpers, eavesdroppers and IoT devices are PPP distributed with intensities λ K , λ E and λ X . And let us adapt a few definitions from graph theory and from [19] to our case:
Definition 5 (Poisson iS-Graph for IoT networks). The Poisson intrinsically Secure graph (iS´graph) for IoT networks
1 is the directed graph G " tX Y tx 0 u , T u with vertex set X Y tx 0 u and edge set
Definition 6 (IoT-GW in-degree N in ). In the Poisson iSGraph for IoT networks, the IoT-GW in-degree N in is the number of edges entering the IoT-GW vertex. In other words, it is the average number of secure connections in the IoT network.
Definition 7 (IoT-GW In-isolation).
In the Poisson iS-Graph for IoT networks, the IoT-GW In-isolation is the probability that the IoT-GW cannot receive from anyone with positive secrecy rate.
By the definitions above, we want the IoT-GW to be the least In-isolated possible by letting each helper generate a neutralization zone of finite size.
We approximate the neutralization zones as in [19] by associating to each helper k i a neutralization zone Θ i inside of which all eavesdroppers will be neutralized. Thus the total neutralization region Θ is given as
Where #K is the number of element in K.
The area around the IoT-GW is most sensitive because, the closer an eavesdropper is to the IoT-GW the higher the probability of In-isolation. Therefore, the IBFD IoT-GW broadcasts AN which generates a fixed neutralization region of radius ρ IoT centered at the IoT-GW. With this model, absence of AN-aided transmit strategy for the IoT-GW is equivalent to ρ IoT " 0. Considering generic channel gains g xy , we provide a full characterization of the proposed cooperative model with the following theorem. 
IoT q´expp´λ e πpΘR 2 q ‰˙(
11)
With pΘ " e´λ
This result shows how the network parameters are linked to the number of secure connections. Compared to the result shown in [19] our result takes into account the physical size of the network, the presence of helpers, as well as generic channel gains.
B. Blind Jamming Strategies
We now turn our attention to the case where jamming operations are performed by the IoT-GW in cooperation with a set of helpers in the form of multi-antenna friendly jammers. This could model a 5G small cell network where each small cell base station additionally operates as an IoT-GW and each served multi-antenna LTE terminal additionally operates as an IoT helper by steering the jamming beam away of the IoT-GW.
In a first approach, we can assume that each eavesdropper is jammed only by the closest helper node to its location. This approximation is even more realistic in the case where the IoT-devices use the technique Divide-and-Conquer [8] for their data transmission, provided that the messages are encoded across a sufficiently large number of blocks and the helpers are sending jamming signals sporadically.
A second approach is to assume that all the eavesdroppers are receiving a jamming signal from all the helpers at the same time. In this scenario also, we consider that the helpers are able to steer their interference away from the IoT-GW. The performance of the two approaches above will be shown and compared in the numerical section (Section V). A more detailed analysis of this work will be presented in a future publication.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
For the simulation we consider a NB-IoT network whose IoT devices transmit with constant power P " 0dBm across a bandwidth B 1 which is 200kHz wide and is centered at f c " 0.9GHz. We set g min "´20dB (minimum possible path loss for the co-located case [20] ) and calculate path losses for d ě 10m according to A logpdq`B`C logpf c q with A " 22, B " 28, C " 20 (typical urban LOS [21] ). In all simulations we set γ 0 " 6 and γ E " 3.
In this real world scenario, we want to analyze the results presented in the form of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 we show the minimum required IoT-GW performance (in terms respectively of dB to be canceled from the self-interference signal and artificial noise transmit power) needed in order to fully secure a disk area of radius R around the IoT-GW. From the figures it is easy to notice that the case with co-located eavesdropper is practical only for very small IoT networks. In fact, a state-of-the-art self-interference cancellation mechanism and 38dBm of AN transmit power would be required to fully secure a disk area of only 20m radius. On the other hand, by considering neutralization zones it is possible to secure wider areas with less resources. For instance, a 60m radius area can be fully secured by means of a 95 dB self-interference cancellation mechanism and 22 dBm AN transmit power for the 5m protected surroundings case.
In Fig. 5 we show the secrecy capacity lower bound for IoT communications within a network of radius R (according to Eq. 1), by settings the IoT-GW transmit power to 30dBm and the self-interference cancellation performance to 10´1 0 . We say lower bound because that is the secrecy capacity calculated wrt the worst case connection scenario (with and without neutralization zones). Note that this holds true because all the IoT devices transmit with the same power. From the figure, one can see the secrecy capacity goes to zero for R ě 32m, 53m and 87m for the co-located, 1m and 5m protected surrounding case respectively. Fig. 6 shows the ASC from the IoT devices to the IoT-GW in percentage of the total number of IoT-devices against the size of the neutralization regions generated by the helpers. The neutralization zone of the IoT-GW is fixed at ρ IoT " 0m and the network size is R " 100m. The Monte Carlo simulation and theoretical curves are shown for λ x " 0.1, which corresponds to an average number of 3141 IoT devices. We see that the simulation curves and the lower bounds are very close.
In Fig. 7 we show the ASC when the eavesdroppers are jammed by the closest helper only. Three different Fig. 3 . Minimum self-interference cancellation (SIC) performance required at the IoT-GW in order to achieve fully secure NB-IoT communications across a disk-shaped area of radius R around the IoT-GW. Path losses for 1m and 5m are set to 30dB and 40dB respectively [20] . Fig. 4 . Minimum required IoT-GW transmit power performance to achieve fully secure NB-IoT communications across a disk-shaped area of radius R around the IoT-GW. Path losses for 1m and 5m are set to 30dB and 40dB respectively [20] .
cases are shown, first, when the IoT-GW is not sending jamming signal in the network we see that with helpers power of -5dBm only 40% of the IoT devices are secured in average. This number grows to almost 60% when the IoT-GW sends a 0dBm jamming signal and 90% when the IoT-GW jamming signal power is 15dBm. However, even without IoT-GW jamming, the helpers are able to secure 90% of the IoT-devices with a power of just 5dBm whereas the IoT-GW would need at least 15dBm to obtain the same results.
In Fig. 8 we compare the scenario where an eavesdropper is jammed by its closest helper to the one where the eavesdropper is jammed by all the helpers. The first obvious result is that the performance is higher when all the helpers are considered at the same time. However, the gap between the two scenario is smaller if the helpers are transmitting at higher power, and the aggregate interference created by the network to potential neighboring networks is much less if only one helper is jamming at one time.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have studied the confidentiality of the communications flowing from a network of Internet of Things (IoT) devices to a reference IoT Gateway (IoT-GW) in the presence of potential eavesdroppers and helpers. By building Lower bound, λ e =0.005
Monte carlo, λ e =0.01
Lower bound, λ e =0.01 Fig. 6 . Average number of secure connections to the IoT-GW against the size of de neutralization regions of the helpers. Settings: ρ IoT " 0m, λx " 0.1, λ k " 1.10´2m´2, R " 100m. No IoT-GW AN P o =0dBm Fig. 7 . Average number of secure connections to the IoT-GW against the transmit power of the helpers and for different transmit AN power at the IoT-GW, settings: λx " 0.1, λe " 5.10´4m´2, λ k " 5.10´4m´2, R " 100m, γ E " 3, γ 0 " 6, h 0 " 10´1 0 . 
on the concepts of jamming by artificial noise (AN) and In band full duplex we have proposed smart jamming strategies which can enhance security against eavesdropping. To study the proposed jamming strategies, we have used the concept of neutralization zones, which are areas within the IoT network where all eavesdroppers are deactivated. We have shown that the solution where only the IBFD IoT-GW generates AN is viable only for small IoT networks and when neutralization zones are generated around the IoT-devices. In the case with helpers and punctual proximity jamming instead, we have shown that the Average number of Secure Connections (ASC) increases at least exponentially with the density of the helpers. In our parallel ongoing work, we are studying AN-based smart jamming strategies for downlink IoT communications, for the backhaul (i.e., from the IoT-GW to an IoT cloud receiver), and for delay-sensitive applications.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that:
Assuming reciprocal channel gains (i.e., e.g., g i0 " g 0i ) and for the worst case where an eavesdropper e˚is co-located with a transmitting IoT-device i (i.e., g i0 " g e˚0 " g 0e˚) , SIN R ie˚c an be written as follows:
According to conditions (2) an IoT-device can establish a secure connection with the IoT-GW if SIN R i0 ě γ 0 , SIN R ie˚ă γ E and γ 0 ą γ E , i.e.,
N1`P0h0 ě γ 0 P g min N1`P0gi0 ă γ E It is easy to verify that the system of inequalities above is solved for (point 1 of the Theorem). From this one can easily infer that 1) if g(.) is strictly decreasing as a function of the distance d xy between positions x and y, the most stringent condition for h is wrt the farthest IoT-device i˚from the IoT-GW. Thus, if the inequality holds for such worst case, then it holds for all the IoT devices of the network (point 1 of the Theorem)
2) The minimum feasible P 0 is
, where is the smallest possible power increasing step (point 2 of the Theorem).
Proof of Theorem 3
In order for a device (say x) to be able to establish a secure communication link to the IoT-GW there must not be any eavesdropper within a disk of radius d xo around the device. If there is an eavesdropper within Bpx, d xo q then to keep the link secure that eavesdropper must be neutralized by a helper or by the IoT-GW. Hence, the set of users able to achieve a secure communication link to the IoT-GW is given as S "
WhereB px, d xo q " Bpx, d xo q{Bp0, ρ IoT q is the disk centered on x of radius d xo without the zone neutralized by the IoT-GW. We can write the number of secure links from the IoT devices to the IoT-GW as Where Dpρ IoT , Rq is the annulus centered at the origin with inner radiusρ IoT and outer radius R with 0 ďρ IoT ď R . Now let's find the palm probability P x tx P Su P x tx P Su " P Θ,K !B px, d xo q XΘ X K " H )
" E Θ ! expp´λ e ApB px, d xo q XΘq )
ě exp´´λ e E Θ ! ApB px, d xo q XΘq
Where (17) is obtained using Jensen's inequality, E X is the average according to the random variable X, Apq gives the area of a specified random region. 
Therefore P x tx P Su ě expp´λ e πpΘd 2 xo q
And finally we can obtain equation (11) by plugging this last result back into equation (14) .
